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Abstract
It is common practice for public pension schemes to offer indiv duals the option to delay benefit claiming
until after the normal retirement age and adjust the annual benefit level as a result. This adjustment is often
not actuarially neutral with respect to the age at which benefits are claimed. The degree of actuarial nonequiv-
alence varies by interest rates as well as individual characteristics such as gender and age. In this paper we
show that actuarial nonequivalence can imply that deferring benefit claiming is suboptimal, irrespective of the
preferences of the individual. Specifically, we derive prefe nce-free conditions under which delaying benefit
claiming is dominated by claiming benefits early, and using them to buy super-replicating annuity products
from an insurance company. We find that the degree of actuarial nonequivalence in public pension schemes
is such that such dominating strategies can exist even when the purchase of annuities would be significantly
more costly than what is currently observed. If individualschoose to strategically exploit these dominating
strategies, this will affect benefit claiming behavior, which n turn affects long run program costs.
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In many countries, individuals can decide either to claim their Social Security old-age pension benefits once
the minimal retirement age has been reached, or to delay benefit claiming. In case of delay, the individual is
offered the same choice next period and so on, until either the maximum age at which benefits can be claimed
has been reached or benefits have been claimed. When an individual defers pension receipts, the benefit level
is subjected to an actuarial adjustment for each year that benefit claiming is delayed.1 In many cases, the
adjustment is a constant fraction of the benefit level at the normal retirement age, irrespective of age, gender,
and other individual characteristics. In the U.S. and the U.K., the benefit levels increase by respectively 8%
and 10.4% for each year benefit claiming is delayed (see Diamond, 2005; Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006).
In the Netherlands a proposal has been put forward to increase the benefit level by only 5% for each year of
delay. As argued by, e.g., Horneff et al. (2008), governments seem to want simple and standardized rules for
annuitization applied to a large heterogeneous group of retirees, which may be the reason for choosing a fixed
instead of an age-dependent accrual.
The adjustment of the benefit level in case of delayed benefit claiming is typically not actuarially neutral in
the sense that the expected present value of the missed benefits i case benefit claiming is delayed is typically
not equal to the expected present value of the additional benefits received once benefits are claimed (see, e.g.,
Coile et al., 2002; Duggan and Soares, 2002; Brown, 2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003; Sun and Webb, 2009).
This lack of actuarial neutrality occurs for several reasons. First, the expected present value of the missed and
additional benefits in case of delayed benefit claiming depends o the term structure of interest rates. Higher
short-term interest rates typically decrease the expectedpr sent value of the missed benefits relative to the
expected present value of the additional benefits. The opposite holds for high long-term interest rates. The
adjustment of the benefit level in case of delayed benefit claiming, however, is typically fixed for a number of
years and therefore not adjusted for changes in the term structure of interest rates. Second, an age-independent
accrual leads to actuarial unfairness because, as age increases, the number of years over which the increased
benefit level should be paid out decreases, and the missed benfits due to deferral of one more year increase.
Finally, the expected present value of the missed and additional benefits in case of delayed benefit claiming
depend on survival rates, which depend on individual characte istics such as gender and socio-economic status.
Thus, heterogeneity among participants leads to actuarialnonequivalence at the individual level (see Brown,
2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003).2
1Such possibilities exist in Social Security pension systemin, e.g., the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands, Japan, Germany, France,
Australia. (see Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006).
2The actuarial nonequivalence is well-documented in the literature. For example, Duggan and Soares (2002) calculate actuari lly fair
adjustment factors when benefits are claimed at ages 62 to 70,and find that results depend strongly on both gender and discount rate. They
also find that the annual accrual for delayed benefit claimingof 8%, given in the U.S., is too low in most cases. Desmet and Jousten (2003)
show that there is a high degree of heterogeneity among partici nts of a large public pension system, so that benefit adjustments that are
based on the ”average” participant can lead to large degreesof actuarial unfairness at the individual level .
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As argued by Duggan and Soares (2002) actuarially nonequivalent benefit adjustments may have unintended
consequences in the sense that they affect claiming behavior. Coile et al. (2002) and Sun and Webb (2009)
consider optimal claiming of Social Security benefits in theU.S., and argue that even when the adjustment of the
benefit level is lower than actuarially fair, delaying benefit claiming can be attractive to risk averse individuals.
This occurs because a risk-averse individual attaches morevalu to the increased longevity insurance due to
the higher benefit level.3 Coile et al. (2002) find that delaying Social Security annuitization for a period of
time after the minimal retirement age is optimal in a wide variety of cases under expected utility maximization.
Sun and Webb (2009) find that, for plausible preference parameters, the optimal age to claim Social Security
benefits for single individuals is between 67 and 70.
Our goal in this paper is to show that the actuarial unfairness inherent in many public pension systems implies
that an individual who wishes to defer the receipt of pensionbe efits may be better off by claiming Social
Security benefits immediately and using them to buy annuity products. Consider, for example, a man aged
66 who would like to receive pension benefits as of age 67. He can do so by deferring benefit claiming with
one year, which implies that his benefit level will be increased. Suppose now that the level of the accrual is
actuarially unfair for this particular man in the sense thatt e expected present value of the missed benefits at
age 66 is higher than the expected present value of the additional benefits received as of age 67. If the difference
is sufficiently large, insurers may be able to offer a deferred annuity that starts to pay out as of age 67, with a
benefit level that is higher than the accrual offered by the pension provider, and for a periodic premium that is
lower than the benefits received in case they are claimed at age 66. If this is the case, the individual is better
off by claiming benefits at age 66, and using these benefits to buy the deferred annuity.
In this paper we characterize conditions under which insurer can offersuper-replicatingannuity products. The
annuity product is super-replicating if it satisfies two conditions. First, it can be bought for a periodic premium
that is at most equal to the benefit level obtained in case Social Security benefits are claimed immediately.
Second, upon annuitization it yields a benefit level that is at le st equal to the benefit level received in case
Social Security benefits would have been claimed at that age.If these two conditions are satisfied, deferred
benefit claiming is dominated because the individual is better off by claiming benefits immediately and using
them to buy the annuity product. An important aspect of this approach is that because the annuity product
is super-replicating, there is preference-free dominanceof immediate benefit claiming. All that is required
for the individual to prefer claiming benefits immediately and using them to buy the annuity product is that
more is preferred to less. To characterize such preference-free dominance conditions, we consider two cases.
First we consider the case where an individual at a given age decides as of which age he would like to receive
3There is an extensive literature that characterizes individuals’ optimal behavior with regard to the timing and level of annuitization of
their wealth (see, e.g., Yaari, 1965; Brugiavini, 1993; Brown, 2001; Milevsky, 2001; Brown, 2003; Davidoff et al., 2005; Gupta and Li,
2007; Horneff et al., 2006; Milevsky and Young, 2007a,b; Gerrard et al., 2010, to name just a few). Our focus is on claimingbehavior in
Social Security systems with delay options.
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his pension benefits, and derive conditions under which insurer can offer deferred annuities that the individ-
ual prefers above deferring benefit claiming. Next, we determine conditions under which insurers can offer
super-replicating annuity options for those individuals who want to defer receipt of pension benefits until an
unspecified age. The individual who buys the annuity option ca , year by year, decide whether he wants to
annuitize, or defer annuitization for at least one more year.
Whether insurers will be able to offer super-replicating annuity products depends on the degree of actuarial
unfairness in the Social Security system, as well as on how insurers price annuity products. Two factors are
important. First, annuities offered by insurance companies ar typically also not actuarially fair in the sense
that the premium includes a load to cover costs. Second, in contrast to Social Security providers, insurers can
adjust premium conditions to the prevailing term structureof interest rates. Moreover, they can to some extent
differentiate premiums based on individual characteristics that affect survival rates. We first consider the case
where insurers can differentiate premiums on the basis of age and gender only, and characterize conditions
on the level of the premium load and the term structure of interest rates under which they can offer super-
replicating annuity products to men and women, respectively. We find that there is ample room for insurers to
profitably offer annuity products that men prefer above deferring benefit claiming. For women it is less likely
that dominating strategies exist. We then consider the casewhere insurers can also differentiate premiums
based on factors that are correlated with educational level. This additional flexibility increases the room for
insurers to offer super-replicating annuity products, in particular to individuals with lower educational levels.
This occurs because individuals with lower educational levels have lower life expectancy, and therefore the
accruals offered by the social security system are more unfair for them.
Our results potentially have important implications because the existence of super-replicating annuity products
can alter claiming incentives and may thereby distort benefit acceptance decisions. Specifically, it can imply
that individuals may decide not to defer benefit claiming, even though they do wish to defer annuitization. This
can affect the long-run program costs of public pensions (see Hurd et al., 2004). Benefit claiming decisions
are not only important for public pensions but also for defined b nefit (DB) pensions. It is not uncommon
that participants in a (DB) pension plan can, at least to someext nt, choose at which age they claim benefits.
The annual benefit level is then adjusted to the age at which benefits are first claimed. When the adjustments
are not actuarially neutral with respect to the age at which benefits are claimed, participants may choose to
strategically exploit outside options offered by insurance companies. This may affect claiming behavior, which
in turn affects the plan’s liabilities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section2 discusses factors that generate actuarial unfair-
ness in Social Security pension systems with delay options.In Sections 3 and 4 we consider the case where
insurers differentiate premiums based on gender only, and chara terize conditions under which they can offer
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super-replicating annuity products for men and women, respectively. We also quantify the potential gains for
both individuals and insurers. Section 3 considers individuals who wish to defer the receipt of pension benefits
to a specific age. Section 4 extends the analysis to cases where the individual wishes to defer the receipt of
pension benefits to an unspecified age. In Section 5 we illustrate he potential gains when insurers can, in
addition to gender, also differentiate premiums on the basis of factors correlated with educational level. We
end with the conclusions in Section 6.
2 Actuarial unfairness
Existing literature shows that the option to delay Social Security benefit claiming is often actuarially unfair in
the sense that the expected present value of the additional be efits in case of deferred benefit claiming is strictly
lower than the expected present value of the missed benefits (see, e.g., Coile et al., 2002; Duggan and Soares,
2002; Brown, 2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003; Sun and Webb, 2009). This unfairness implies that individuals
who wish to defer the receipt of pension benefits may be betteroff by claiming benefits immediately, and using
them to buy annuity products at the market. Our goal is to characte ize under which conditions insurers can
offer annuity products that individuals prefer above deferring benefit claiming.
We focus on cases in which an individual wishes to delay the rec ipt of pension benefits beyond the so-called
full retirement age, which we denote byx.4 Each year, the individual decides either to claim old-age pension
benefits immediately, or to delay benefit claiming for a period of at least one year.5 In case of delay, the
individual is offered the same choice next year and so on, until either the maximum age at which benefits can
be claimed has been reached or benefits have been claimed. We denote the maximum age at which benefits can
be claimed byx. When the individual claims benefits, he receives them in theform of awhole life annuitythat
periodically pays a fixed amount as long as he is alive. Without l ss of generality, we normalize the annual
benefit level in case benefits are claimed at the full retirement age to1. For each year of delay, the benefit level
increases by a fixed amounta, for somea > 0. Therefore, in case benefit claiming is deferred until agey > x,
the annual benefit level is equal to1 + (y − x) · a.
Whether insurers will be able to offer more attractive delayoptions clearly depends on the degree of actuarial
unfairness in the Social Security system. This degree of unfairness depends not only on the accruala, but also
on the term structure of real interest rates and individual ch racteristics that affect survival probabilities (see,
e.g., Duggan and Soares, 2002). First, higher long-term interes rates lead to less expensive annuities, which
4In many countries (including, e.g., the U.S.), individualscan also claim pension benefits at an earlier age than the fullretirement age,
in which case the benefit level is adjusted downwards. Our focus is on delayed benefit claiming.
5It is not uncommon that individuals can decide on a monthly basis to claim benefits or delay benefit claiming. For expositional
convenience, we assume that the decision is made annually.
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Term Structures of Real Interest Rates
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Figure 1: Term structures of real interest rates (in percentages), generated by a one-factor Vasicek model with
parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B.
may result in an opportunity for insurance companies to outperform the Social Security provider. Second, the
delayed retirement credit does not differ with individual characteristics (such as, e.g., gender) even though sur-
vival probabilities do differ with these characteristics.This leads to actuarial nonequivalence at the individual
level. Thus, even if the system would be fair for the “average” individual, it would be unfair to certain groups
of individuals (see, e.g., Brown, 2003; Desmet and Jousten,2003). Insurers can, at least to some extent, dif-
ferentiate premiums and may therefore be able to offer more attractive delay options to those individuals for
which the Social Security system is actuarially unfair.
To illustrate that the degree of actuarial unfairness can besignificant, and that it depends strongly on both the
term structure of real interest rates and individual characte istics, we determine themoney’s worthof deferring
the receipt of pension benefits. The money’s worth of the option to delay benefit claiming is defined as the ratio
of the expected present value of the missed benefits over the expected present value of the additional benefits
received as of claiming age (see, e.g., Sun and Webb, 2009). Let us denoteR(τ) for the τ -years real interest
rate, andτpx for the probability that an individual with agex survives at least the firstτ years. Now consider
an individual agedx who wants to defer the receipt of pension benefits to agey. Because the missed benefit
equals1+ a(x− x) at agesx, · · · , y− 1, and the additional benefit equals· (y− x) annually as of agey, the
money’s worth of deferring benefit claiming from agex to agey, denoted byMW (y, x), is given by:
MW (y, x) =
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Figure 2: The money’s worth of deferring Social Security benefit claiming from age 66 to agey (i.e.,MWy,66)
as a function ofy, for men (left panel) and women (right panel), and for two term structures of interest rates,
generated by a one-factor Vasicek model with parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B. The solid lines
(dashed lines) correspond to a real short rate of2% (3%). The annual accrual isa = 8%, and the full retirement
age is set atx = 66. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004.
Figure 2 displays the money’s worth of delaying benefit claiming from age66 to agey, for y = 67, · · · , 70,
for men and women, and for the two term structures of real interes rates displayed in Figure 1.6 The solid
(dashed) lines correspond to the lower (upper) term structue. We consider the U.S. setting in which the annual
accrual offered by the Social Security system equals8% (i.e.,a = 0.08), and the full retirement age equals 66
(i.e.,x = 66). Survival rates are those of U.S. males (females) for the years 2000 up to and including 2004, as
reported in the Human Mortality Database.7
The option to defer benefit claiming to agey > 66 is actuarially unfair if the corresponding money’s worth is
below one, because this indicates that the expected presentvalue of the additional annuity received as of age
y in return for delaying benefit claiming is strictly lower than the present value of the missed benefits at ages
66, · · · y − 1. Figure 2 shows that the degree of actuarial unfairness can be su stantial, and that it depends
strongly on the term structure of real interest rates as wellas on individual characteristics such as gender and
the preferred deferral period. First, comparing the solid an the dashed lines shows that the deferral option is
more unfair when interest rates are high. When interest rates are higher (dashed lines), the money’s worth shifts
downwards for both men and women, and for all deferral periods. Higher long term interest rates decrease the
6The term structures are generated by a one-Vasicek model with parameters as displayed in Table 5 in Appendix B, and with a sort
rate of 2% (solid lines) and 3% (dashed lines), respectively.
7Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Ger-
many). Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on 05-01-2009). The survival ratesr displayed in
Figure 9 in Appendix A.
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value of the additional benefits relative to the value of the missed benefits, and therefore make deferral more
actuarially unfair. The figure also shows that the system is more unfair for men than for women, and more
unfair for those who wish to defer for a longer period. Because women have higher life expectancy than men,
they are expected to receive the increased benefit for a longer period of time. Therefore, the money’s worth
of deferring benefit claiming is significantly lower for men than for woman. Consider, for example, the case
where the real interest rate is upward sloping from 2% for theeal short rate to just above 3.3% for a maturity of
30 years (Figure 1, solid line).8 The money’s worth for men is below one for all deferral periods. For women,
the money’s worth is above one for deferral of at most two years, but strictly below one for longer deferral
periods. Finally, for both men and women and for both term structures, the money’s worth of deferring benefit
claiming is decreasing in the length of the deferral period.Stated differently, the system is more unfair for
those who would like to delay benefit claiming more than for those who would like to delay benefit claiming
just a couples of years.
The above results suggest that the degree of actuarial unfairness in the Social Security system is substantial, in
particular for those who wish to defer benefit claiming for a longer period. In the next sections we show that
this unfairness implies that individuals who wish to defer the receipt of pension benefits may be better off by
claiming benefits immediately, and using them to buy annuityproducts at the market.
3 Dominating strategies using deferred annuities
In this section we characterize conditions under which the market can offer annuity products that are preferred
by individuals above deferring pension benefit claiming. The annuity products must be attractive for both
insurers and participants, implying that insurers should be a le to offer them on profitable terms and individuals
should achieve a higher benefit level by buying these products than by deferring benefit claiming. Conditions
will be determined under which this holds. When these conditions are satisfied, claiming benefits early and
using them to buy a deferred annuity dominates deferring benefit claiming in the sense that the former strategy
is preferred to the latter, irrespective of the individual’s preference relation.9 An example of such a preference-
free choice is given below.
Suppose that a man with current age 66 would like to receive pension benefits as of age 67.
8The results in this case are similar to those reported in Sun and Webb (2009) using survival rates of the Social Security administration,
and a flat term structure of 3%.
9When the insured claims benefits, they generally are taxed. However, in case the income is used as a premium for annuities,th y
are in many cases received taxfree and then taxed when the annuity pays out. In the U.S. there are some qualified retirementaccounts in
which individuals can invest taxfree. The wealth invested can then be used to finance annuities, where the payments of theannuities are
taxed (see Brown et al., 2001). We assume a tax system were both premiums and returns on the premiums for annuities are exempted from
taxation, and only the annuity payments are taxed.
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Furthermore, assume that the benefit level of his pension whehe claims benefits immediately
equals 100 and that when the man delays benefit claiming by oneear, his future benefit level
will be increased by 8%. Thus, when he defers pension benefit claiming from age 66 to age
67, he will receive an annual benefit of 108 as of age 67. Now suppose that the man is able to
buy a deferred annuity at the market which gives an annual benefit of 9 as of age 67 for a price
of 100. When he claims benefits immediately and uses the benefits to finance this deferred
annuity, he will receive an annual benefit level of 109 as of age 67. We will therefore argue
that, independent of the individual’s preferences, claiming benefits at age 67 is dominated by
claiming benefits at age 66 and using the benefits as a premium for a deferred annuity that
starts to pay out at age 67. The different strategies are displayed in Table 1.
Strategy Annual Cash flow at age
66 67 68 69 70 ....
Claim 66 100 100 100 100 100 ...
Claim 67 - 108 108 108 108 ...
Claim 66, buy deferred annuity - 109 109 109 109 ...
Table 1: The annual payments in a stylized example for a man with age 66, for an accrual of 8%, and for
different strategies.
From Table 1 it is clear that claiming benefits at age 67 is dominated by claiming benefits at age 66 and using
the benefits received that year to buy a deferred annuity thats arts to pay out at age 67. Of course this is just
a stylized example and we still have to analyze the conditions under which insurers can indeed offer a higher
benefit level. In the next subsection we determine sufficientco ditions under which the market can outperform
the option to delay as offered by the Social Security Administration. Unless mentioned otherwise, we consider
the U.S. setting in which the full retirement age is 66 (i.e.,x = 66), the maximum retirement age is 70 (i.e.,
x = 70), and the annual accrual offered by the Social Security system is8%.10
3.1 Characterizing conditions for dominance
In this section we consider an individual who, at a given agex ( .g., the full retirement age), decides as of
which age he would like to receive his pension benefits, and derive preference-free conditions under which
insurers can offer deferred annuities that the individual prefers above deferring benefit claiming.
For an individual agedx, deferring benefit claiming to agey can be considered as buying a deferred real
annuity. The premium equals the missed benefits at agesx, · · · , y − 1. In return for this premium, a deferred
10Because there is an earnings test for claiming benefits before the full retirement age (i.e., between the age of 62 and 65) (see e.g., Song
and Manchester, 2007), we focus on individuals who wish to delay benefit claiming beyond the full retirement age of 66. However, the
analysis can be easily extended to individuals who want to claim before the full retirement age.
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annuity with a benefit level of(y − x) · a as of agey is received. For example, in case benefit claiming is
deferred to agex + 1, a premium of 1 (i.e., the benefit level in case the individualwould have claimed at age
x) is used to finance a deferred annuity with start agex + 1, and benefit levela. If the expected present value
of the additional benefits is lower than the premium paid (i.e., when the money’s worth of this deferred annuity
is less than one), the deferred annuity offered by the pension pr vider is actuarially unfair, and so the market
may be able to outperform the pension provider by offering a more attractive deferred annuity.
Suppose that an individual with agex would like to receive pension benefits as of agey, with y > x. He
could do so by deferring benefit claiming until agey, in which case the benefit level will equal1 + (y− x) · a.
Alternatively, however, the individual could claim benefits at agex, and (conditional on being alive) use the
benefits received up to agey as periodic premiums to finance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age
y.11 Let by,x denote the benefit level offered by the insurer. Then the aggregate benefit level received as of age
y equals the sum of the Social Security benefits that were claimed at agex, 1+ (x−x) ·a, and the payoff from
the deferred annuity,by,x, i.e.,
By,x := 1 + (x− x) · a+ by,x. (1)
This strategy is preferred if insurers can offer a deferred annuity with a benefit levelby,x that is strictly higher
than the accrual offered by the Social Security system, i.e., if
by,x > (y − x) · a, (2)
Indeed, (1) and (2) imply that the aggregate benefit level is strictly higher than the benefit level received in case
Social Security benefit claiming is deferred to agey, i.e.,By,x > 1 + (y − x) · a.
Whether insurers will be able to offer deferred annuities that individuals prefer above deferring benefit claiming
clearly depends on the prices charged for deferred annuities. The annuity insurers offer is in general not
actuarially fair because insurers impose a premium load. The load may include costs for administration and
adverse selection, but also a risk premium, and is typicallyexpressed as a percentagel of the premium (see,
e.g., Mitchell et al., 1999). Now consider an individual whoclaims benefits at agex, and uses the benefits
received at agesx, · · · , y − 1, as periodic premiums to finance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age
y. Then, the benefit levelby,x that insurers would offer follows from setting the expectedpresent value of the
11Alternatively, the individual could use only part of the claimed benefits to buy a deferred annuity. It can be verified thatassuming that
the claimed benefits are fully used is without loss of generality. Deferring benefit claiming is dominated by claiming immediately if and
only if this is the case when the claimed benefits are fully used.
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premium net of cost loading equal to the expected present value of the payments of the deferred annuity, i.e.,

















Combined with (2), this implies that claiming benefits immediately and using them to buy a deferred annuity
dominates deferring benefit claiming if
by,x :=












) > (y − x) · a. (4)
Whether this condition can be satisfied depends on the term structure of real interest rates as well as on the
premium loadl. In the next subsection, we investigate the effect of the term st ucture of real interest rates and
the premium load on the existence of dominating strategies.
3.2 Effect of term structure and premium load
In this subsection conditions are characterized under which insurers can profitably offer deferred annuities that
individuals prefer above deferring benefit claiming. To do so, we compare the benefit levels individuals can
obtain by either delaying benefit claiming or by claiming immediately and using the benefits to buy a deferred
annuity at the market. We first consider a base case in which the term structure of real interest rates is as
displayed in Figure 1, solid line. It is upward sloping from2% for the real short rate to just above3.3% for a
maturity of30 years. The premium load equals7.3%, i.e., l = 0.073.12 We then investigate the sensitivity of
the results with respect to changes in the term structure of ral interest rates or in the premium load.
Table 2 displays the benefit levels for the base case.
For any given agey = 66, · · · , 70, the diagonal displays the benefit level received as of agey when Social
Security benefits are claimed at agey, and the off-diagonal elements (i.e., forx < y) yield the benefit level the
individual receives as of agey when he claims Social Security benefits at an earlier agex, and uses them to
finance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at agey. If the latter exceeds the former (bold entries), deferring
benefit claiming is suboptimal. For example, in case a man aged 66 would like to receive pension benefits as
of age 68, the dominating strategy he can follow is claiming benefits immediately and using these benefits to
buy a deferred annuity which starts paying off at age 68. Men with age 67 or higher and women with age 68
12For most maturities the interest rate is lower than the 3% real interest rate as assumed in for instance Sun and Webb (2009), and Coile
et al. (2002). The load is taken from the 1999 annuity value per pr mium dollar computed on an after tax basis in Mitchell etal. (1999).
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Annuity Claim age (x) Men Claim age (x) Women
Age (y) 66 67 68 69 70 66 67 68 69 70
66 1.00 1.00
67 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.08
68 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.16 1.16
69 1.27 1.27 1.26 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.24
70 1.39 1.38 1.37 1.35 1.32 1.33 1.34 1.34 1.33 1.32
Table 2: The aggregate benefit level received as of agey for an individual agedx, when Social Security benefits
are claimed at agex and used to finance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out atagey (By,x, off-diagonal
elements), and when claiming Social Security benefits is deferr d to agey (diagonal elements). The left (right)
panel corresponds to men (women). The bold entries represent dominating strategies. The annual accruala
equals 8% and the loadl equals 7.3%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the
period 2000-2004. The term structure of real interest ratesis a displayed in Figure 1, solid line.
or higher are better off by claiming benefits immediately andusing them to buy a deferred annuity than by
delaying benefit claiming, regardless of how long they wish to defer the receipt of their pension benefits.
The above results correspond to the term structure as displayed in Figure 1, solid line. Higher long-term interest
rates make deferred annuities cheaper, and so it becomes morlikely that insurers will be able to offer deferred
annuities that individuals prefer above deferring benefit claiming. The opposite holds for lower long-term
interest rates. To investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to changes in the term structure of real
interest rates, we use a one-factor Vasicek model (Vasicek,1977). In this one-factor model, the term structure
is fully determined by the short rate, and so the sensitivityof the results with respect to the term structure of
real interest rates can be investigated by varying the shortrate. Details on the one-factor Vasicek model can be
found in Appendix B.
Figure 3 displays the benefit level that an individual aged66 can obtain as of agey, for y = 67, · · · , 70, as a
function of the real short rate, and for two strategies: claiming benefits immediately and using them to finance
a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at agey (upward sloping lines), and deferring benefit claiming until
agey (horizontal lines).
The figure shows that for each annuity agey, there exists a critical value of the real short rate at whichthe
individual is indifferent between these two strategies. Whenever the short rate is higher than this critical value,
annuities are relatively cheap, and insurers can profitablyoffer annuities that yield higher benefit levels than the
accrual offered by the Social Security (upward sloping linehigher than horizontal line). Thus, deferring benefit
claiming is dominated by claiming benefits immediately and using them to buy a deferred annuity. Below
the critical real short rate, deferring pension benefit claiming is preferred above buying additional annuities
at the market. Second, the figure shows that dominating strategies are more likely to exist for men than for
women. For a man aged 66 who would like to receive pension benefits as of age 67 (solid lines), claiming
benefits early to finance a deferred annuity dominates delayed benefit claiming in case the real short rate is
12
The aggregate benefit level as a function of the real short rate
















































Figure 3: The aggregate benefit level received as of agey, as a function of the real short rate at age 66, when
Social Security benefits are claimed at age66 and used to finance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at
agey (By,66, upward sloping lines), and when claiming Social Security benefits is deferred to agey (horizontal
lines). The left (right) panel corresponds to men (women). The annual accruala equals 8% and the loadl
equals 7.3%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004. The term
structure of real interest rates corresponding to a specificreal short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek
model, with parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B.
above 2.25%. For a woman, the critical real short rate for deferral of one year equals 4.7%, which is quite high.
As a result, dominating strategies are not likely to exist inth s case. Finally, the figure shows that for both men
and women, the critical real short rate decreases when the age as of which they would like to receive pension
benefits increases. For men (women), it decreases to -1.8% (1.2 ) for deferral to age 70 (dashed-dotted lines).
This occurs because the system is more unfair for those who would like to delay benefit claiming more than
for those who would like to delay benefit claiming just a couples of years (recall that the money’s worth of
deferring benefit claiming decreases when the deferral period increases, see Figure 2). Consequently, there is
more room for dominance for individuals who wish to delay thereceipt of pension benefits for a longer period.
The above results correspond to settings where the premium load equals7.3%. It is immediately clear from (4)
that a higher premium load reduces the benefit level that insurer can offer for a given premium, and therefore
makes it less likely that insurers are able to offer deferredannuities that individuals prefer above deferring
benefit claiming. In order to investigate the sensitivity ofour results to the level of the premium load, we
determine the load such that the individual is indifferent be ween deferring benefit claiming, and claiming
immediately and buying a deferred annuity. Consider an indiv dual agedx would like to receive pension
benefits as of agey, with y > x. The individual is indifferent between the two strategies if they yield the same
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benefit level, i.e., if
by,x = (y − x) · a.
Therefore, it follows from (4) that the indifference loadlmax is given by:
lmax = 1−













) = 1−MW (y, x).
As long as the premium load that is strictly lower thanlmax, the market offers deferred annuities that (combined
with the Social Security benefits claimed at agex) give a higher benefit level than the benefit level offered by
the Social Security provider in case benefit claiming is delay d until agey. Thus, deferring benefit claiming is
dominated by claiming immediately.
Table 3 displays the maximum load under which claiming Social Security benefits and using them to buy a
deferred annuity dominates deferring benefit claiming, forall possible combinations of the claim agex and the
annuity agey > x.
Annuity Claim Age (x) Men Claim Age (x) Women
Age (y) 66 67 68 69 66 67 68 69
67 6.51 -6.64
68 12.41 16.39 -0.06 4.29
69 18.14 21.82 24.90 5.30 9.86 13.72
70 23.72 27.10 29.93 32.10 11.06 15.31 18.91 21.97
Table 3: The maximum loadlmax (in percentages) under which, at agex, deferring benefit claiming to age
y > x is dominated by claiming Social Security benefits at agex and using them to buy a deferred annuity that
starts to pay out at agey. The left (right) panel corresponds to men (women). The accrual is set ata = 8%.
The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004. The term structure of
real interest rates is as displayed in Figure 1, solid line.
For men aged 66 who would like to receive pension benefits as ofge 67, the load insurance companies can
impose should be below 6.5%. However, for men who wish to defer th receipt of pension benefits until at
least age 68, loads can be imposed that are significantly higher than the benchmark level of7.3%. For women
aged 66 who would like to receive pension benefits as of age 67 or 8, dominating strategies will not exist
because a negative load is needed. This occurs because for them the option to defer benefit claiming in the
Social Security system is more than actuarially fair (i.e.,the money’s worth is higher than one; see Figure 2,
solid line). For women aged 68 or women who would like to deferb nefit claiming for a longer period, the
loads are also significantly higher than the benchmark level.
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4 Dominating strategies using annuity options
In the previous section we characterized conditions under which it is optimal for the individual to claim pension
benefits at an earlier age than the age as of which he wants to receive annuity benefits, and use the pension
benefits to buy a deferred annuity. We considered the case where an individual at a given age decides as of
which age he would like to receive pension benefits, so that a deferred annuity with the corresponding deferral
period can be bought. This section considers an individual who ishes to defer the receipt of pension benefits
until an unspecified age. We develop an annuity product, called anannuity option, in which the individual
can, year by year, decide whether he wants to annuitize or defe annuitization for at least one more year. We
characterize conditions under which insurers can offer annuity options that super-replicate those offered by the
Social Security provider.
4.1 Super-replicating annuity options
In this subsection we design annuity optionthat super-replicates the option to delay benefit claiming in the
Social Security system. The individual who buys this optionpays a periodic premium (in case he is still alive)
until the time he decides to annuitize, and from there on receiv s annuity payments from the insurer. The level
of the periodic premium depends on the age at which the product is bought. The level of the annuity payment
depends on the age at which the option to annuitize is exercised, as well as on the age at which the option is
bought. Let us denote:
• x for the age at which the insured buys the annuity option;
• Y ∈ [x+1, x] for the age at which the insured annuitizes.Y is unknown until it is reached, we denotey
for any given realization ofY ;
• π(x) for the premium paid at agesz ∈ [x, Y − 1], conditional on being alive, and given that the annuity
option was bought at agex;
• by,x for the benefit level of the annuity, conditional on annuitizing at agey, and given that the annuity
option was bought at agex. We assume that:
0 = bx,x ≤ bx+1,x ≤ · · · ≤ bx,x.
At each agez ∈ [x+1, x−1], the individual decides either to pay a premium ofπ(x) and defer annuitization for
at least another year, or to stop paying premium and annuitize. When he annuitizes, he receives an immediate
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annuity from the insurance company with a benefit levelby,x that depends on his current agey, and the agex
at which he bought the annuity option. The benefit levels are det rmined at the moment the annuity option is
bought.
This annuity option (weakly) dominates the option to delay benefit claiming in the Social Security system if
the periodic premium is at most equal to the benefit level obtained in case benefits are claimed at agex, and,
for each possible annuity agey, the level of the annuity payment is at least equal to the accrual offered by the
Social Security system in case benefit claiming would have been delayed to that age, i.e.,
π(x) ≤ 1 + (x − x) · a, (5)
by,x ≥ (y − x) · a, for all y = x+ 1, · · · , x. (6)
If these two conditions are satisfied with at least one strictinequality, then for an individual agedx who did not
yet claim pension benefits, further deferring benefit claiming is dominated by claiming benefits (of1+(x−x)·a)
and using (part of) these benefits to pay the periodic premiums for the annuity option. Indeed, (5) implies that
the benefits are sufficient to pay the periodic premium, and (6) implies that, for any given annuity agey, the
aggregate benefit level (from Social Security benefits claimed at agex and from the annuity option),
By,x := 1 + (x− x) · a+ by,x,
is weakly higher than the benefit level received in case Social Security benefit claiming is deferred to agey.
Whether insurers will be able to offer super-replicating annuity options clearly depends on how they are priced.
Because the risk associated with uncertainty in the age at which t e individual will exercise the option to
annuitize cannot be hedged, the payoffs of the annuity option cannot be replicated by payoffs from existing
assets. In the following subsection we determine conditions u der which there exists a selffinancing strat-
egy that super-replicates the payoffs of the annuity option. The strategy is selffinancing if any new assets or
annuity payments can be financed from revenues from previously bought assets combined with the premium
received from the individual. If these conditions are satisfied, insurers can offer annuity options that satisfy the
dominance conditions (5) and (6), while making nonnegativeprofits in each future year.
4.2 The financing strategy of the insurer
We first design a strategy such that at every possible exercise date, the insurer holds a portfolio of zero-coupon
bonds with a market price equal to the price of the annuity in case the insured annuitizes at that date. If the
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insured does not annuitize, the payoff of the bond portfoliois used to finance a new bond portfolio. If the
insured annuitizes, the bond portfolio is sold to finance theimmediate annuity. Formally, suppose that an
individual agedx buys an annuity option at timet = 0, and consider the following strategy:
• At agex, the insurer knows that the benefit level of the annuity will be at leastbx+1,x. He buys a portfolio
of zero-coupon bonds which cash flow matches the expected payments (plus cost loading) of the annuity
in case the insured annuitizes at agex + 1. Because survival probabilities beyond the age of 110 are





· spx, in yearss = 1, ..., 110− x.
• At agex < z < Y , the insured does not yet annuitize, and the insurer knows that the benefit level upon
annuitization will be at leastbz+1,x, i.e., the benefit level increases by at least
b̃z,x =bz+1,x − bz,x.





· spx, in years
s = z − x + 1, · · · , 110 − x. Combined with bonds bought at agesx, · · · , z − 1, this implies that he












· spx, in yearss = z − x+ 1, ..., 110− x.





· z−xpx from previously bought bonds, as well as a premium payment













· spx, in yearss = Y − x, ..., 110− x.
The market price of this bond portfolio equals the price of the annuity that pays offbY,x in every future
year that the insured is alive.
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This strategy yields the desired payoff as of ageY . For it to be selffinancing, however, revenue at each age
before annuitization needs to be sufficient to finance the newbond portfolio. In every year in which the insured
has not yet exercised the annuity option, the insurer receivs revenue which consists of the premium paid by the
insured and the cash flow of previously bought bonds which mature. From this revenue, he needs to finance a
bond portfolio. The strategy therefore involves losses when t price of the bond portfolio exceeds the revenue.
Moreover, for agesz > x, the price of the bond portfolio that needs to be bought at agez depends on the term
structure of real interest rates in yeart = z − x > 0. To eliminate this interest rate risk, the insurer can, for
each agez = x + 1, · · · , x − 1, buy a call option with maturity datet = z − x on the corresponding bond
portfolio. To minimize the price of the call options while still guaranteeing that revenue is sufficient to buy the
bond portfolio, we set the strike priceK(z, x) of the call option on the bond portfolio that needs to be bought








In the following table we summarize the insurer’s revenue and expenses at each age, with and without call
options. We denotePCalls(x) for the datet = 0 price of the portfolio of call options. Moreover, to avoid
overloaded notation, we denotePBonds(z, x) for the datet = z−x price of the bond portfolio that needs to be
bought at agez.








Expenses without options PBonds(x, x) PBonds(z, x)
with options PCalls(x) + PBonds(x, x) min{PBonds(z, x),K(z, x)}
Profit without options +/− +/−
with options +/− +
Table 4: The insurer’s revenue and expenses at agez (i. ., in yeart = z − x), for z = x, · · · , Y − 1, for an
insured who buys the annuity option at agex and exercises it at ageY , and for two financing strategies: the
case where the insurer buys call options and the case where hedoes not buy call options. The last two rows
display the sign of the corresponding profit (revenue minus expenses).
With call options, expenses at agex increase, but expenses at agesz ∈ [x+1, Y −1] (weakly) decrease because
the required bond portfolio can be bought at the minimum of the market price and the strike price of the call
option. Moreover, because the strike price of the call option on the bond portfolio that needs to be bought at
a given age is set equal to the revenue at that age, the revenuealways weakly exceeds the expenses at any age
z > x. Thus, the insurer can offer the annuity option at a nonnegative profit in every year if and only if revenue
18
exceeds expenses at agex, i.e., if and only if
PCalls(x) + PBonds(x, x) ≤ π(x). (8)
Our goal is to characterize conditions on the premium load, nd the term structure of real interest rates under
which the dominance conditions (5) and (6), and the profit condition (8) are satisfied. When these conditions
are satisfied, insurers can profitably offer annuity optionssuch that individuals who wish to defer the receipt of
pension benefits until an unspecified age are better off by claiming benefits and using them to buy the annuity
option. This approach is conservative in the sense that it assumes that the insurer wishes to eliminate all interest
rate risk. If insurers are willing to bear some risk, the conditions under which they can offer super-replicating
annuity options will become less strict.
4.3 When can the insurer profitably offer a super-replicating annuity option?
In this section we first determine conditions on the term structure of real interest rates under which insurers can
profitably offer super-replicating annuity options. We then investigate the sensitivity of these results to the level
of the premium load charged by insurers. Finally, we quantify the potential gains for insurers from offering
super-replicating annuity options.
To characterize conditions on the term structure of real interest rates and the profit loading under which insurers
can profitably offer super-replicating annuity options, weconsider the annuity option thatreplicatesthe option
to defer benefit claiming in the Social Security system, i.e.w set
π(x) = 1 + (x − x) · a, (9)
by,x = (y − x) · a, for all y = x+ 1, · · · , 70. (10)
and investigate under which conditions an insurer who uses the elffinancing strategy defined in Subsection 4.2
makes a strictly positive profit in the year in which the annuity option is sold (i.e.,PCalls(x)+PBonds(z, x) <
π(x)). If this is the case, the insurer can profitably offer the replicating annuity option because, as can be seen
from Table 4, the revenue weakly exceeds expenses in all future years. Moreover, since the profit in the first
year is strictly positive, either the annual premiumπ(x) could be decreased or the benefit level for at least one
annuity agey could be increased, so that a super-replicating annuity option can be offered while still making
a positive profit. An individual who wishes to defer annuitiza on until an unspecified age is then better off by
claiming benefits and using them to buy that annuity option tha by further delaying benefit claiming. Indeed,
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either the individual has strictly more wealth before annuitization (if π(x) < 1 + (x − x) · a), or the benefit
level as of annuitization is strictly higher for at least oneannuity age (ifby,x > (y − x) · a).
Expenses and revenue of the insurer




































Figure 4: The insurer’s revenue (π(x), horizontal lines) and expenses (PCall(x) + PBonds(x, x), downward
sloping lines) in the year in which the annuity option is sold, as a function of the real short rate at that time.
The solid (dashed) lines correspond to an individual who buys the annuity option at agex = 66 (x = 67). The
accruala offered by the Social Security system is set at 8%, and the profit load l equals 7.3%. The left (right)
panel corresponds to men (women). The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period
2000-2004. The term structure of real interest rates corresponding to a specific real short rate is generated with
a one-factor Vasicek model, with parameters given in Table 5in Appendix B.
Figure 4 displays the insurer’s revenue (horizontal lines)and expenses (downward sloping lines) in the year
in which the annuity option is sold, as a function of the real short rate at that time.13 The revenue equals the
premium paid by the individual. The expenses are equal to thepric of the portfolio of call options and bonds
that needs to be bought at the time the contract is sold (for details, see Table 4). The figure considers two cases.
The solid lines correspond to an annuity option sold to an indiv dual aged 66, for a periodic premium of1 (i.e.,
the Social Security benefit level if benefits are claimed at age 66). The dashed lines correspond to an annuity
option sold to an individual aged 67, for a periodic premium of 1.08 (the Social Security benefit level if benefits
are claimed at age 67).
First consider men who buy the annuity option at agex = 66 (left panel, solid lines). The figure shows that
there exists a critical value of the real short rate at which the insurer’s expenses in the first year are equal to
the revenue (the premium received from the insured). When threal short rate is above the critical value of
2.25%, the portfolio of call options and bonds becomes less expensive, i.e., the expenses decrease. This implies
13Recall that in the one-factor Vasicek model, the term structure is fully determined by the short rate, and so the sensitivity of the results
with respect to the term structure of real interest rates canbe i vestigated by varying the short rate. Details on the Vasicek model as well
as on how the price of the portfolio of call options and bonds is determined can be found in Appendices B and C.
20
that the insurer can profitably offer a super-replicating annuity option. Men aged 66 who wish to defer benefit
claiming until an unspecified age are then better off by claiming benefits immediately and using them to buy
that annuity option. Indeed, that strategy yields a higher benefit level, regardless of when they will decide to
annuitize. When the annuity option is bought at age of 67 instead of age 66 (left panel, dashed lines), the
conditions for dominance are even more likely to be fulfilled. The reason is that the maximum premium the
insurer can ask (the benefit level in case Social Security benefits are claimed at age67) increases from1 to
1.08, and the minimum benefit level that he needs to offer when the individual annuitizes at agey (the accrual
offered by the Social Security benefits when benefit claimingis deferred to agey) decreases from(y − 66) · a
to (y− 67) · a. Therefore, the insurer’s revenue increases (the horizontal li e shifts upwards), and the expenses
decrease (the downward sloping line shifts downwards). Formen aged 67 (left panel, dashed lines), a positive
real short rate is enough for them to prefer buying an annuityop ion above deferring benefit claiming. For
women (right panels), dominating strategies are less likely to exist. Because they have higher life expectancy,
the option offered by the Social Security provider is less unfair for them. For women aged66, the real short
rate would need to be well above 4%, which is unlikely to be thecase. For women aged67, insurers can offer
annuity options that they prefer above deferring benefit claiming if the real short rate is above 2.75%.
The above results correspond to a premium load of 7.3%. In order to investigate the sensitivity of our results
with respect to the level of the premium load, we determine the maximum value of the premium load under
which an insurer who follows the selffinancing strategy described in Subsection 4.2 can profitably offer the
replicating annuity option. Specifically, we determine theload such that the insurer’s expenses in the first year
equal the premium received from the insured in that year, i.e., PCalls(x) + PBonds(z, x) = π(x). Whenever
the load charged by insurers is strictly lower than this maxium load, the market can offer super-replicating
annuity options that individuals strictly prefer above deferring Social Security benefit claiming.
Figure 5 displays the maximum feasible load as a function of the real short rate. The solid (dashed) lines
correspond to a super-replicating annuity option sold to anindividual aged 66 (67). The left panel corresponds
to men; the right panel corresponds to women. Because highervalues of the real short rate make annuities less
expensive, the maximum feasible load is increasing in the real short rate. There is more room for insurers to
offer annuity products that individuals prefer above deferring benefit claiming when interest rates are high. For
men who buy the annuity option at age 66, the feasible load is above 7% whenever the short rate is at least
2%. For women, the maximum load is negative for most realistic values of the real short rate, indicating that
dominating strategies are not likely to exist. However, when the product is bought at age 67, the maximum
feasible load increases significantly for both men and women.
The above results were determined for the case where the insurer uses a conservative financing strategy in
which all interest rate risk is eliminated. Insurers, however, may be willing to take some risk, which implies
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Maximum feasible load as a function of the real short rate


































Figure 5: The maximum loadlmax (in percentages) under which insurers can offer a super-replicating annuity
option to men (left panel) and to women (right panel) aged 66 (solid lines) and aged 67 (dashed lines), as a
function of the real short rate. The accruala is set at 8%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males
(females) for the period 2000-2004. The term structure of real interest rates corresponding to a specific real
short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek model, with parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B.
that there may be more room to offer super-replicating annuity options. To conclude this section, we therefore
quantify the potential gains for insurers from offering super-replicating annuity options under the two financing
strategies described in Subsection 4.2: eliminating all interest rate risk by buying a portfolio of call options,
and accepting some interest rate risk. In both cases, the financing strategy is such that upon annuitization, the
insurer holds a portfolio of bonds with a market price equal to the market price of the annuity. Therefore, the
insurer’s profit consists of profit made in all years prior to annuitization.
As an illustration, we consider a super-replicating annuity option sold to an individual aged66 for a periodic
premium equal to1 (the Social Security benefits claimed at age66), with benefit levels given by:
by,x = 0.08, for y = 67,
= 0.08 + (y − 67) · 0.09, for y = 68, · · · , 70.
(11)
Thus, the benefit level received upon annuitization is strictly higher than the accrual offered by the Social Se-
curity system as soon as annuitization is delayed until at least age68. We determine the probability distribution
of the present value of the insurer’s profits in all years prior to annuitization, in case the individual exercises the
option to annuitize at age 68. The profit in the first year depends on the short rate at the time the annuity option
is sold (i.e., when the individual turns 66); the profit made in the year in which the insured turns 67 depends
on the short rate next year (see Table 4 for details on these profits). The former is known when the contract is
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offered, but the latter is stochastic.
Figure 6 displays the probability distribution of the insurer’s profit for two values of the short rate at the time
the contract is sold. The upper (lower) panel corresponds tothe case where the real short rate at the time the
contract is sold equals 2.25% (3%). In each case, the figure displays the present value of the insurer’s profit as
a function of the real short rate next year (bars), as well as the probability that the real short rate next year falls
into the corresponding bracket (stems). It considers two financing strategies: buying call options (light grey
bars) and not buying call options (dark grey bars). The premium load is set equal to 7.3%. Profit values are
displayed on the left y-axis, probability values are displayed on the right y-axis.
The figure shows that for both financing strategies and for both values of the short rate at the time the contract
is sold, the insurer’s profit is (weakly) increasing in the real short rate next year. This occurs because and higher
short rate next year makes the bond portfolio that needs to bebought at age 67 less expensive. Comparing the
upper and the lower panel shows that profits are also increasing in the current real short rate. A higher real
short rate at the time the contract is bought (lower panel) makes the portfolio that needs to be bought in the first
year less expensive, and, in addition, makes it more likely that he short rate in the second year is also higher,
so that the bond portfolio that needs to be bought at age 67 also becomes less expensive. When the short rate
at the time the contract is sold equals 3%, the insurer’s profit is almost surely positive even when interest rate
risk is not hedged.
We now discuss the effect of the financing strategy. When calloptions are bought, the first year profit is strictly
lower, but the second year profit is weakly higher because thebond portfolio that needs to be bought at age
67 can then be bought at the minimum of the market price and thestrike price of the call option. Because the
market price of the bond portfolio is decreasing in the shortrate, there exists a critical value of the short rate
in the second year such that the present value of profits with call options is lower (higher) when the short rate
is below (above) the critical value. Specifically, when the sort rate in the second year is above2.125%, the
market price of the bond portfolio is lower than the strike price of the call option. Therefore, the profit made in
the second year is the same for the two financing strategies, and so the present value of profits is lower when
call options are bought. The difference (the price of the call options) is about 0.5% of the annual premium
when the current short rate is 2.5% (upper panel, dark grey bars), and negligibly small in case the current short
rate is 3% (lower panel). When the short rate in the second year falls below the critical level of2.125%, the
price of the bond portfolio is strictly higher than the strike price. Therefore, the second year’s profit is zero in
case the insurer bought call options, but strictly negativein case he did not. So, without call options the present
value of profits can be negative, but the size and likelihood of such losses depend strongly on the current real
short rate. When the current short rate is 2.25% (upper panel), a loss is made whenever the short rate falls
below the critical level of2.125%. In contrast, when the current short rate is 3% (lower panel), the profit made
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The present value of the insurer’s profit

























(a) real short rate of 2.25% at age 66

























(b) real short rate of 3% at age 66
Figure 6: The present value of the insurer’s profit for a man who buys the annuity option at age 66 and exercises
it at age 68. The bars represent the present value of the insurer’s profit as a function of the real short rate
next year, for two financing strategies: buying call options(light grey bars) and not buying call options (dark
grey bars). The stems represent the probability that the real short rate next year falls into the corresponding
bracket.Profit values are displayed on the left y-axis, probability values are displayed on the right y-axis. The
upper (lower) panel corresponds to the case where the real short rate at age 66 equals 2.25% (3%). The benefit
levels of the annuity option are as given in (11). The accrualoffered by the Social Security system is set at
8%. The premium load is set equal to 7.3%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for
the period 2000-2004. The term structure of real interest rates corresponding to a specific real short rate is
generated with a one-factor Vasicek model, with parametersgiven in Table 5 in Appendix B.
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in the first year is significantly higher, and high enough to compensate for the loss made in the second year as
long as the short rate is in the second year is not below 1.375%. The probability that the short rate falls below
this level is negligibly small, so that the insurer almost surely makes no losses, even when interest rate risk is
not hedged.
4.4 How much can individuals gain from buying annuity options?
The previous subsection shows that, depending on the real short rate and the premium load, insurers can make
significant profits from offering a replicating annuity option. This suggests that they may also be able to offer
annuity options with benefit levels that are significantly higher than those offered by the Social Security system,
while still making a nonnegative profit. In this subsection we quantify the potential gains for individuals from
such super-replicating annuity options.
Recall that in case of delayed Social Security benefit claiming, the accrual received for an additional year of
delay equalsa for every year of delay. Such a fixed accrual implies that the def rral option is more unfair for
those who wish to defer for a longer period (recall that the money’s worth is decreasing in the length of the
deferral period, see Figure 2). This occurs because the expected number of years over which the additional
benefit payment should be made decreases when benefit claiming is delayed further. Consequently, insurers
might be able to offer annuity options in which the accrual received for an additional year of delay increases
each year. To illustrate the potential gains for insureds, we consider the case where the insurer offers an annuity
option with the following conditions:




(1 + c)τ · b, (13)
for someb, c ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, the annual premium for the annuity option is equal to the Social Security benefits
received in case they are claimed at agex, and the accrual received for an additional year of delay increases by
c% each year. Consider, for example, an individual agedx = x = 66 who would like to defer the receipt of
pension benefits. If he claims Social Security benefits immediat ly and uses them to buy the annuity option, he
will receive an annual benefit level as of age 69 of1 +
[
1 + (1 + c) + (1 + c)2
]
· b. In contrast, if he delays
Social Security benefit claiming until age69, he receives1 + 3 · a.
Figure 7 displays the total benefit levels received as of agey = 67, · · · , 70, as a function of the real short rate,
for two strategies: the case where the individual claims benefits at agex and uses them to buy the annuity
25
Benefit level as a function of the real short rate

























(a) Men aged 66

























(b) Women aged 66
























(c) Men aged 67
























(d) Women aged 67
Figure 7: The aggregate benefit level received as of agey, as a function of the real short rate at agex, when
Social Security benefits are claimed at agex and used to buy the annuity option (By,x, upward sloping lines),
and when claiming Social Security benefits is deferred to agey (horizontal lines). The upper (lower) panel
corresponds tox = 66 (x = 67). The left (right) panel corresponds to men (women). The annu l accrual
a equals 8% and the loadl equals 7.3%. The benefit levels of the annuity option are as defined in (13) with
c = 0.1. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004. The term
structure of real interest rates corresponding to a specificreal short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek
model, with parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B.
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option (upward sloping lines), and the case where he defers benefit claiming until agey (horizontal lines). The
upper (lower) panels correspond tox = 66 (x = 67). The benefit levels offered in the annuity option are as
defined in (13). To illustrate the potential gains for indiviuals, we choosec = 10%, and letb be the level that
insurance companies can offer in a competitive market in which excess profits are driven to zero (i.e., condition
(8) is satisfied in equality). The accrual offered in the Social Security system is set at= 8% and the premium
load is set atl = 7.3%.
The figure shows that insurance companies are able to offer anattractive alternative to the option to defer
pension benefit claiming as offered by the Social Security provider when the real short rate is sufficiently high.
Strict dominance occurs when for every given annuitizationagey, the benefit level received in case the annuity
option is bought is higher than when benefit claiming is deferr d (i.e., the upward sloping line is above the
horizontal line for all annuity agesy). In order to have strict dominance a real short rate of 2.25%is needed for
men and of 4% for women. However, some individuals may know for sure that they do not wish to annuitize
before a certain age. In such cases, insurers are able to offer attractive annuity options even when the short rate
is lower. Suppose, for example, that an individual with age 66 knows that he would like to defer annuitization
until at least age 68. Then, dominating annuity options exist already when the real short rate is above 1% for
men and 3.5% for women. When the individual knows he would like to defer until at least 69, the critical
values of the real short rate decrease to 0.25% for men, and 2.75% for women. There is even more room for
insurers to offer attractive annuity options when the option is bought at age 67 (lower panels). An individual
can, for example, defer social security benefit claiming until age 67, and then use the claimed benefits to buy
an annuity option. In this case, insurers can offer a productthat dominates further delay of pension benefit
claiming irrespective of the real short rate for men. The reason is that a higher annual premium is paid (1.08
instead of 1) and that the minimum required benefit level uponannuitization (the accrual offered by the Social
Security benefits when benefit claiming is further deferred to agey) decreases.
5 Dominating Strategies using differentiated survival rates
In the previous sections we characterized conditions underwhich insurers can offer super-replicating annuity
products, taking into account that they can differentiate premium and benefit levels on the basis of gender.
There is strong empirical evidence, however, that mortality ra es also depend substantially on individual char-
acteristics such as, for example, educational level. This heterogeneity leads to actuarial nonequivalence at the
individual level (see, e.g., Brown, 2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003). In contrast to Social Security providers,
insurers may, at least to some extent, be able to differentiat premiums on factors that affect survival probabil-
ities. If this is the case, there is more room to offer super-replicating annuity products for those individuals for
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Figure 8: The benefit level(B67,66) as a function of the real short rate for different groups who buy an option
to annuitize at age 66 and annuitize at age 67. The horizontalli e denotes the benefit level when benefits are
claimed at age 67. A factorc of 10% and a loadl of 7.3% were assumed. The survival probabilities are those
of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004. The term stucture of real interest rates corresponding to
a specific real short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek model, with parameters given in Table 5 in
Appendix B.
which the accruals offered in the Social Security system aremore unfair. To illustrate the potential effects, we
characterize conditions under which insurers are able to offer the super-replicating annuity option defined in
(13) to groups of individuals who differ in educational level. Three educational levels are distinguished: less
than high school, high school plus up to three years of college, and college graduates. We use relative mortality
factors differentiated to age, gender, and educational leve determined by Brown (2003) to calculate the differ-
entiated survival probabilities (see Appendix D). As in thepr vious section we consider the case where excess
profits are driven to zero, i.e., the benefit levelb is such that the insurer’s profit in the first year is zero.
Figure 8 displays the benefit level that an individual aged66 can obtain as of age67, as a function of the real
short rate at age 66, and for two strategies: claiming benefits immediately and using them to buy the annuity
option (upward sloping lines), and deferring benefit claiming until age67 (horizontal lines). It distinguishes
three educational levels: low education (solid lines), high school education (dashed lines), college graduate
(dashed-dotted lines). The figure shows that the critical level of the real short rate above which insurers can
offer super-replicating annuity options is increasing in the educational level. Because individuals with lower
educational levels have lower life expectancy, they expectto receive the additional benefits offered by the So-
cial Security system for a shorter period of time, which implies that the system is more unfair for them. The




In many countries accruals to annual pension benefits are offered to those who claim benefits later. Typically,
these accruals are fixed for a number of years, and are indepennt of both interest rates and individual char-
acteristics such as gender. In addition, the accrual receivd for an additional year of delay is typically a fixed
percentage of the benefit level in case benefits are claimed atthe full retirement age. The actuarially fair value
of the additional deferred annuity that the individual receives in case he delays benefit claiming, however, de-
pends nontrivially on the length of the deferral period, theterm structure of real interest rates, and individual
characteristics that affect survival rates. As a consequence, public pension systems with fixed accruals are not
actuarially fair, and the degree of unfairness varies over time (as it depends on the term structure of real interest
rates). Moreover, the degree of unfairness depends on individual characteristics.
We show that the actuarial unfairness implies that individuals who wish to defer the receipt of pension benefits
may be better off by claiming benefits and using them to buy annuity products at the market. Conditions under
which it is optimal for them to do so are investigated in a prefe nce-free setting assuming only that more is
preferred to less. We first quantify the degree of unfairnessin the public pension system on the basis of the
market term structure of real interest rates, generated by aVasicek term structure model. We then characterize
conditions under which insurers can offer attractive deferral options without taking any interest rate risk. Our
results suggest that there is a broad range of settings (for market conditions, required premium loads, and indi-
vidual characteristics) in which insurers can profitably offer deferral options that are more actuarially fair than
those offered by the public pension provider. Individuals can exploit these options by claiming benefits early,
and using them to buy annuity products from insurers. The potntial gains for individuals and insurers increase
when market conditions are more favorable (e.g., when interes rates are relatively high), and when insurers
have more flexibility to differentiate premium and benefit levels on the basis of individual characteristics. If in-
dividuals choose to strategically exploit outside optionsffered by insurance companies, this will affect benefit
claiming behavior, which in turn affects long run program costs.
29
Appendices
Appendix A Survival Probabilities
Throughout the paper, we use the one-year mortality probabilities differentiated to age and gender reported by
the Human Mortality Database for U.S. males (females) for the year 2000 up to and including 2004.14 Let qx
denote the probability that an individual with agex dies within one year. The probability that an individual is





Figure 9 displays the cumulative survival probabilities, conditional on being alive at age 66, i.e.,τp66, as a
function ofτ .
Cumulative Survival Probabilities





















Figure 9: The cumulative survival probabilities (τp66), as a function of age (66 + τ ) for men (solid line) and
women (dashed line) respectively with age 66.
Appendix B The One-factor Vasicek Model
The Vasicek model assumes that the instantaneous real shortrate at timet, rt, is generated by:
drt = κ[θ − rt]dt+ σdWt, r(0) = r0,
14Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Ger-
many). Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on 05-01-2009).
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whereWt is a Wiener process,θ denotes the long-run mean,κ the parameter of mean reversion, andσthe
volatility.
The time-t price of a zero-coupon bond which matures at timeT , denoted byP (rt, t, T ), is given by:
P (rt, t, T ) = exp {A(t, T )} · exp {−B(t, T ) · rt},
with
B(t, T ) =
1− exp {−κ · (T − t)}
κ
, (14)
A(t, T ) = [B(t, T )− (T − t)]
(






· B(t, T )2, (15)
and whereλ denotes the market price of risk. Then, the time-t r al interest rate for a maturity ofT − t years
given that the short rate at timet equalsrt, is given by:
R(rt, t, T ) =
− logP (rt, t, T )
T − t
.






Table 5: The parameter values of the Vasicek model for interes rate.
The long-term averageθ is set equal to 2%. Moreover, the market price of riskλ is set equal to0.5. This
reflects a setting in which the real interest rate for a maturity of six years is0.5% higher than the short rate.
The benchmark case displayed in Figure 1, solid line, corresponds to the case where the real short rate equals
the long-term averageθ.
Appendix C Pricing call options on bond portfolios
In this subsection we determine the pricePCalls(x) of the portfolio of call options that the insurer buys in order
to eliminate interest rate risk. Jamshidian (1989) has derived an exact formula to price options on (coupon-
bearing) bonds, assuming that interest rates are generatedby a one-factor Vasicek model. The pricing problem
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is further addressed in Hull (2003) and Brigo and Mercurio (2001). Let us denoteP (r, t, s) for the date-t price
of a zero-coupon bond with maturity dates, given that the real short rate at timet qualsr. The date-0 price of
a call option with strike priceK and maturity datet, on a zero-coupon bond with maturitys and principalL, is
given by:
C(s, t,K, L) = L · P (r0, 0, s)Φ(h)−K · P (r0, 0, t) · Φ(h− σP ),
whereΦ(·) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution functio , r0 denotes the real short rate at time





L · P (r0, 0, s)













respectively, whereκ denotes the parameter of mean-reversion andσ denotes the volatility of real short rate.
Recall that, for each agez = x+ 1, · · · , x− 1, the insurer needs to buy a call option with strike priceK(z, x)






spx. The price of this call option is equal to the price of aportfolio
of call options, one for each individual zero-coupon bond, where the strike pricesK(z, x, s) of the individual
call options are such that
∑
K(z, x, s) = K(z, x), and they all have the same exercise region, i.e.,
K(z, x, s) = Lz,x,s · P (r
∗, z − x, s)
with r∗ such that:
110−x∑
s=z−x+1
Lz,x,s · P (r
∗, z − x, s) = K(z, x).
(18)







C(s, z − x,K(z, x, s), Lz,x,s), (19)





spx, and withK(z, x, s)
determined by (7) and (18).
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Appendix D Differentiated survival probabilities
In this Appendix we discuss how we determine survival rates differentiated by age, gender, and educational
level using the relative mortality factors from Brown (2003). He constructs age-specific relative mortality
factors for black, white, and Hispanic men and woman, where the white and black groups are then further
differentiated on the basis of education. Three educational levels are distinguished for whites, namely: less
than high school, high school plus up to three years of college, and college graduates. To obtain survival
probabilities differentiated by educational level, we multiply the relative mortality factors for white men and
women with different educational level with the mortality probabilities from the Human Mortality database
as described in Appendix A. Letc(e)x denote the relative mortality factor of an individual with age x with
educational levele. The probability that an individual with educational levele is alive overτ years conditional






(1− qx+υ−1 · c
(e)
x+υ−1)
The differentiated cumulative survival probabilities forwhites are displayed in Figure 10.
Cumulative Survival Probabilities













































Figure 10: The cumulative survival probabilities differentiated to gender and educational level for men (left)
and women (right), conditional on being alive at age 66.
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